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HELLER AND INSURRECTIONISM
Carl T. Bogust
The Supreme Court does not merely decide legal issues. It is an
authoritative voice about national values. Much of its authoritative power
flows from being the quasi-official interpreter of the Founders' visions of
America, as expressed in the Constitution. The Constitution, of course, is
more than a legal document; it is the scripture of American political
theology. What the Founders believed when they wrote that document--or
more precisely, what we believe they believed-influences our own visions
about America. The most significant aspect of District of Columbia v.
Heller is the Court's pronouncement that the Founders intended to
guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms.' But there is another
idea lurking in the Court's opinion with potentially great ramifications of
its own: the idea that the Founders gave us a right to keep and bear arms as
an ultimate check against governmental tyranny. 2 This is an insurrectionist
theory because it legitimizes a right of the people to be armed, potentially
to go to war against their own government.3 The Court, however, so far,
has embraced this idea tentatively and perhaps not irrevocably. This essay
is a plea that it reconsider its endorsement of insurrectionism.
To understand what is at stake, it helps to consider the differences
between the American and French revolutions. Notwithstanding the
oxymoronic sound of it, America's break with England was a conservative
revolution. Americans did not seek to radically alter their society.4 They
were not fundamentally suspicious of government; they believed
t Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Many thanks to Dan
Morton-Bentley for his research assistance, and to both him and Cynthia Giles for their
comments on an earlier draft. Portions of the following op-ed article are incorporated in this
essay: Carl T. Bogus, The Supreme Court Reaches the Rubicon: Do We Place Our Faith in
Law or Guns? PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 4, 2007, at B4.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
2. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801-02.
3. For more about insurrectionism, see Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the
Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 386-04 (1998); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms,
Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107, 110 (1991) (coining the term).
4. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF HOPE 84 (Princeton U.
Press 2008) (1963) (arguing that in contrast to the French Revolution and other
revolutions seeking to overthrow feudal systems, "The American Revolution was . . . a
revolution of limited liability, aiming at national independence more than at social
change.").
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government was necessary to protect liberty. Nor were they even opposed
to the British form of government, though they devised ways to improve
upon it. They believed England's government failed them because they
were unrepresented in Parliament.
Americans undertook a revolution to preserve more than to destroy.
Even though they went to war to secure independence, Americans never
lost faith in ordered liberty. By contrast, as historian William Doyle puts it:
"The initial impulse of the French Revolution was destructive. The
revolutionaries wanted to abolish what, by the end of 1789, everybody was
calling the old or former order, the ancien r~gime. ' 5 French revolutionaries
sought liberty through violence-and came to romanticize violence. Some
16,000 were guillotined or otherwise executed during the Terror, and
approximately 150,000 more died in factional fighting.6
The Russian and Chinese revolutions were stepchildren of the French
Revolution. 7 According to Mao Tse-tung: "War is the continuation of
politics.... When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it
cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles
from the way." 8 "Revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable in
class society, and without them it is impossible to accomplish any leap in
social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and
therefore impossible for the people to win political power." 9 "Political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun." 10
Consider how the Founders reacted when, following the Revolution,
Americans threatened force against their own government. In 1786, Shays'
Rebellion broke out in western Massachusetts. Complaining that the
government had become tyrannical because courts were permitting
creditors to seize their property to satisfy delinquent debts, a thousand
small farmers and shop owners-armed with muskets-closed the courts
and began to threaten the state government. Thomas Jefferson, then
ambassador to France on the eve of the French Revolution, was
momentarily swept away. In a letter to Madison, Jefferson remarked that
"a little rebellion now and then is a good thing."" Madison would have
5 WILLIAM DOYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 65 (2001).
6. Id. at 98.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, in II SELECTED WORKS 1937-1938 at 152-53
(1954). Mao was, of course, borrowing from Carl von Clausewitz who wrote that "war is
nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means." CARL
VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 121 (1908).
9. Mao Tse-tung, On Contradiction, in I SELECTED WORKS 1937-1938 at 344 (1954).
10. Mao Tse-tung, Problems of War and Strategy, II SELECTED WORKS, at224 (1938).
11. See Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, supra note 3 at 393 (and
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none of it and in his reply, Madison called Shays' Rebellion treason. 12 The
governor of Massachusetts raised an army to crush the rebellion. His
action was endorsed not only by Madison but by Samuel Adams, John Jay,
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and John Marshall. 13
In the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, backcountry farmers in
Pennsylvania and Kentucky threatened tax collectors and otherwise used
intimidation to obstruct collection of a federal tax on whiskey. They
carried muskets and marched as militia under banners proclaiming "Liberty
and Equality" and other slogans of the French Revolution. Washington
said allowing such conduct would bring an "end to our Constitution &
laws," and he personally led 12,000 troops to extinguish the rebellion. 
14
Interpreting the Second Amendment is about more than the
government's authority to regulate guns: it is about whether we place our
ultimate faith in the Constitution or in guns. The Founders were deeply
concerned about abuse of power, but their solution was to create a system
where too much power could not be consolidated in one place. Alexander
Hamilton wrote:
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts
composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the
representation of people in the legislature by deputies of their own
election .... [These] are means, and powerful means, by which the
excellences of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided. 
15
To Hamilton's list we may add other protections as well, including freedom
of speech and press. 16
The Founders understood that tyranny may come not only from rulers
but from the people themselves. Hamilton wrote:
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions
with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of
revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
sources cited therein).
12. Id. at 394-95.
13. Id.
14. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 77 (2006).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
16. Hamilton also included "enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to
revolve," by which he meant the protections against abuse by small fractions or
parochialism that come with a large, heterogeneous nation. Id.
20081
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between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. 1 7
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Hamilton's contemporary,
Edmund Burke, brilliantly examined how legitimizing force within society
leads to chaos, blood, and ultimately despotism.18 And speaking about the
governmental system devised by the American Founders, Barry Goldwater
wrote: "The system of restraints, on the face of it, was directed not only
against individual tyrants, but also against a tyranny of the masses." 19
Proponents of insurrectionism often cite Federalist No. 46 in which
Madison said that should the federal government become tyrannical, its
army would be opposed by more powerful state militia composed of
"citizens with arms in their hands ... fighting for their common liberties,
and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
confidence." 20  When one reads that statement in context, however, one
sees that Madison does not suggest that such an eventuality could come to
pass. Quite the reverse: he says this fear is an Anti-Federalist pipe dream.
Madison writes:
That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time,
elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both [the state
and federal governments]; that the traitors should throughout this period,
uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension
of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the
States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and
continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on
their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent
dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a
counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine
patriotism.21
"Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made," Madison
writes, and he proceeds to respond to what he considers an absurd
argument on its own terms.22  All of this precedes the line about the
"citizens with arms in their hands" going to war with an invading federal
government. 23 Madison's point is not that guns are the ultimate check on
tyranny but that the constitutional structure is the full protection of liberty.
17. Id.
18. See generally, EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(Frank M. Turner ed., Yale U. Press 2003) (1790).
19. BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 10 (CC Goldwater ed.,
Princeton U. Press 2007) (1960).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
256 [Vol. 59:253
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But even if we attach undeserved significance to Madison's line about war
between the federal army and the state militia, it should be noted that
Madison was not talking about armed citizens-mobs-taking matters into
their own hands, but about action by the state militia. And whatever
legitimacy that latter idea had was extinguished by the Civil War.
The fundamental problem with legitimizing insurrectionism as an
acceptable last resort is that there are always people who believe that
governmental tyranny is not merely a future prospect, but a present reality.
Insurrectionism has been present throughout American history, but until
relatively recently it primarily has been popular with vigilantes and
paramilitary groups; it was the philosophy of Jefferson Davis, John Wilkes
Booth, and Timothy McVeigh. But it is a view that some conservatives-
perhaps unthinkingly-have started to endorse. In so doing, they are
abandoning faith in ordered liberty embraced by traditional conservatives,
such as Burke, in favor of a new conservatism that has more in common
with Robespierre and Mao Tse-tung.
Heller settled the longstanding debate about whether the Second
Amendment granted a collective or an individual right. The traditional
view of the Second Amendment-the collective rights or the militia-based
model-is that the Amendment grants the people a right to keep and bear
arms only within the constitutionally-mandated militia, in effect
guaranteeing the states armed militia to provide for their own security.
2 4
Advocates of this model often say that guaranteeing armed militia to the
states ameliorated Anti-Federalist worries about standing armies because
the existence of robust militia made large standing armies unnecessary.
25
There is, however, good reason to believe that James Madison wrote the
Amendment to assure the South that Congress could not undermine the
slave system by disarming the militia, upon which the southern states relied
for slave control.2 6
The Heller majority rejected the collective rights model in favor of the
individual rights model, which holds that the Second Amendment grants
the people a right to keep and bear arms for their own purposes, untethered
from militia membership. 27 The main rationales offered for the individual
rights theory are self-defense, aiding firearms proficiency within the militia
by having a general population accustomed to firearms, and
24. Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 4 (2000).
25. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 347-48;
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2001).
26. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 335-37.
27. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
2008] 257
Syracuse Law Review
insurrectionism. Some individual rights theorists rely on one or two of
those rationales; some rely on all. The insurrectionist rationale has become
increasingly romanticized and emphasized by individual rights advocates.
Prior to Heller, eleven federal courts of appeals considered the Second
Amendment-nine endorsed the collective rights model, and two endorsed
the individual rights model. 28  The first Federal Court of Appeals to
endorse the individual rights view of the Second Amendment, the Fifth
Circuit, provided at most a vague endorsement of insurrectionism. 29 That
court wrote: "The Anti-Federalists feared that the federal government's
standing army could be used to tyrannize and oppress the American people.
Without a militia to defend against the federal government's standing army,
the states and their citizens would be defenseless."
30
The court did not dwell on the disturbing prospect of another civil
war, pitting state militia against the army, nor did it proceed any further
with insurrectionist explanations. 31 Having walked to the edge and peered
into the abyss, the court sensibly turned round and looked for another
rationale for the individual rights model. The right to bear arms, said the
court, "tends to enable, promote or further the existence, continuation or
effectiveness of that 'well-regulated Militia' which is 'necessary to the
security of a free State."' 32 This, of course, is a weak rationale for the
Amendment. Having a citizenry well-versed in the use of arms may be a
boon to the militia-and for the same reason to the federal military services
as well-because it is easier to train "firearms-familiar citizens" to shoot
and care for firearms. 33 But how likely is it that the Founders were so
worried about having a draft pool unaccustomed to firearms that they
decided to foster shooting skills by giving the people an individual right to
keep and bear arms? There are more direct ways to promote proficiency
with arms. Moreover, the real concern at the time was not that militia
28. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003); Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265,
1273-74 (11 th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v.
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019-20
(8th Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Members of City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Warin,
530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (all endorsing the collective rights model). See Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2007); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229 (supporting the
individual rights model).
29. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259-260.
30. Id. at 238-39.
31. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259-60.
32. Id. at 233.
33. Id. at 259.
258 [Vol. 59:253
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members were unaccustomed to firearms but that they were unaccustomed
to discipline.
34
The Fifth Circuit backed still further away from insurrectionism by
suggesting that the Second Amendment was a political compromise. The
Anti-Federalists "desired a bill of rights, express provision for increased
state power over the militia, and a meaningful express limitation of the
power of the federal government to maintain a standing army."
35
Meanwhile, "Federalists wanted to please the Anti-Federalists as much as
possible without fundamentally altering the balance of federal-state
power," and they "had no qualms with recognizing the individual right of
all Americans to keep and bear arms." 36 And-abracadabra!-Federalists
satisfy Anti-Federalists' concerns about allocation of power over the
military organizations by giving individuals a "right to keep and bear arms
whether or not they are a member of a select militia or performing active
military service or training."37
The best one might say for this less-than-logical conclusion is that
political compromises are not always rational. That may be so;
nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's explanation is an awkward stretch
compared to the more straightforward explanation that Madison and his
fellow Federalists, who controlled the First Congress, wrote the Second
Amendment to assuage Anti-Federalists fears about disarming the militia.
The purpose of giving people a right to keep and bear arms in connection to
militia service-in which the possession and use of those weapons is
unquestionably subject to regulation by the militia-was that if the federal
government did not provide arms for the militia, militia members
themselves could do so. That, in fact, is how the militia was then armed;
militia members were required to supply their own muskets.3" But intent
upon arriving at the conclusion that the Second Amendment grants an
individual right, the Fifth Circuit found itself on the horns of a dilemma.
Self-defense was a problematic rationale because it is nonsensical to read
the Amendment as saying, [a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
for their own self-defense and unconnected with Militia service shall not be
34. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 339-44.
35. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
38. See CORNELL, supra note 14, at 12 and 123 (describing requirements that militia
members arm themselves incorporated in both the pre-Revolution militia acts in the colonies
and the federal Uniform Militia Act of 1792).
2008]
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infringed. The insurrectionist rationale was even worse because it is
antithetical to fundamental notions of constitutional democracy. That, I
suspect, is why the Fifth Circuit settled on a frizzy rationale that was
neither self-defense nor insurrectionism.
In the Heller case, the District of Columbia Circuit became the second
federal circuit to endorse the individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment, and the first to embrace the insurrectionist rationale.3 9 The
court not only peered into the abyss, it jumped in. The court actually
settled on self-defense and insurrectionism, collapsing both into a single
rationale that it labeled "the right of self-preservation." 40 That right, the
court said, "was understood as the right to defend oneself against attacks by
lawless individuals, or, if absolutely necessary, to resist and throw off a
tyrannical government." 4 1  Yet the court apparently found its own
explanation somehow inadequate. By the end of its opinion, it opted for
the kitchen sink approach and threw in hunting and threats of foreign
invasions for good measure. 42  According to the court, the Second
Amendment "was premised on the private use of arms for activities such as
hunting and self-defense, the latter being understood as resistance to either
private lawlessness or the depredations of a tyrannical government (or a
threat from abroad)."43  The court failed to explain why the federal
government cannot be trusted to keep the nation armed and ready to repel
invasions, or why the Founders might have been worried that rampant gun
control would interfere with hunting. Then, having already swallowed the
poison pill of insurrectionism, the D.C. Circuit-uneasy but perhaps not
sure why-threw into the kitchen sink the rationale about an armed
populace indirectly supporting the militia. The court explained that, "[iln
addition, the right to keep and bear arms had the important and salutary
civic purpose of helping to preserve its citizen militia .... by ensuring that
citizens would not be barred from keeping the arms they would need when
called forth for militia service." 44 The last interpretation, of course, runs
into the problem of saying the Amendment is about supporting the militia
yet independent of militia service. The court simply reemphasizes:
"Despite the importance of the Second Amendment's civic purpose,
however, the activities it protects are not limited to militia service, nor is an
39. Parker v. District of Columbia, 479 F.3d 370 (2007). The name of the case
changed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
40. Id. at 383.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 395.
43. Id.
44. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395.
[Vol. 59:253
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individual's enjoyment of the right contingent upon his or her continued or
intermittent enrollment in the militia." 45  The phrase continued or
intermittent enrollment in the militia is a revealing slip. Why simply not
say the right is not "contingent upon enrollment in the militia?" Isn't that
what the court means? By subtly suggesting that everyone is in the militia
sometime-something that was not true when the Second Amendment was
written and is not even remotely true today-the court hopes to somehow
gloss over the problem that what it claims is the purpose of the right (to
promote the militia) does not fit with what it claims is the nature of the
right (a private right unconnected to militia service).46
It was against this background that Justice Scalia sat down to write the
majority opinion in Heller. Justice Scalia alluded to insurrectionism twice,
but each time just briefly.47 His first reference comes as he is discussing
why the Founders considered the militia to be "necessary to the security of
a free state." 48 He says the reasons are many but lists only three.49 He first
names "repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections" and rendering
"large standing armies unnecessary," citing Alexander Hamilton for the
second rationale. 50  Then, without any citation, Justice Scalia declares:
"Third, when the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and
organized, they are better able to resist tyranny." 51 He next alludes to
insurrectionism when rebutting arguments advanced by the District of
Columbia. He writes:
If, as [the District believes], the Second Amendment right is no more
than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of the organized
militia-if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional
beneficiary of the Second Amendment's guarantee-it does not assure
the existence of a 'citizens' militia' as a safeguard against tyranny.
52
45. Id.
46. In 1792, the militia consisted of "free able bodied while male citizens" eighteen to
forty-five years of age. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 67 (2006). By excluding women,
free and enslaved blacks, the disabled, and men younger than eighteen and older than forty-
five, the militia included only a fraction of the population. Today an even smaller fraction is
enrolled in the National Guard.
47. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800, 2802. Strictly speaking, Justice Scalia mentions
insurrectionism three times, but his third reference occurs not while describing the Court's
reasoning but the reasoning in Aymette v. State, reasoning the Heller Court does not adopt.
Id. at 2809 (discussing 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)).
48. Id. at 2800.
49. Id. at2800-01.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2801.
52. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2802 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
2008]
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Once again, this reference to insurrections is a naked declaration, devoid of
authority.
For anyone who previously doubted it, Heller should make clear that
when it comes to the Second Amendment, even Supreme Court Justices
are, at bottom, driven not by a dispassionate analysis of history or public
policy but by ideology. After all, how likely is it that nine justices of the
Supreme Court are moved entirely by their objective evaluation of history
yet divide 5-4, along perfectly ideological lines? To say this is not to
suggest that the justices did not try their best to put aside their own views
and decide the case on a good faith analysis of history and law. It is to
suggest only that they are human, and, whether or not they are aware of it,
moved by deeper instincts.
What in their ideology drives modem conservatives to the individual
rights view of the Second Amendment, and for some, even further to the
insurrectionist rationale? For the most part, the five conservative justices
are not traditional conservatives in the mold of Edmund Burke and his
modem heirs, such as George F. Will, who believe that "strong
government-properly constructed"--is the guarantor of liberty, but
movement conservatives who are suspicious of, and even hostile to,
government.5 3 In the main, the modem conservative movement's general
antipathy to government flows from two sentiments: first, it sees
government as generally inefficient and often incompetent; second, it sees
governmental power and personal freedom as inversely correlated, that is,
as a general matter, the more powerful the government, the less free the
individual.54 These are the assumptions that lead to the conservative
movement's constant paean for "limited government."
I have been speaking so far about sentiments that infuse conservative
ideology but it may be helpful to briefly consider political philosophy.
Perhaps the most extreme edge of modem conservative cries for limited
government may be found in libertarian philosophy, which seeks to
articulate how governmental functions should be delimited. Libertarians
believe that government should be limited to only three functions:
protecting citizens against violence or fraud, providing a justice system to
resolve disputes, and protecting the nation against foreign invasion.
5
Under libertarian philosophy, it is a legitimate function of government
53. See Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 Mo. L. REv. 387, 388, 390-91 (2007).
54. GOLDWATER, supra note 19, at 8-9, 11-12.
55. FRANK S. MEYER, IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM 99-100 (1996). See also DAVID BOAZ,
LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 186 (1997) (stating that the role of government is "to protect our
rights, creating a society in which people can live their lives and undertake projects
reasonably secure from the threat of murder, assault, theft, or foreign invasion").
262 [Vol. 59:253
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to maintain police departments to protect citizens against criminal assaults.
But do libertarians consider it legitimate for government to regulate, even
ban, handguns? I assume most libertarians believe government may
properly prohibit the private ownership of substances such as anthrax,
sarin, or plutonium. That, after all, is part of the government's role of
protecting individuals against violence. As a matter of political
philosophy, banning handguns is the same kind of decision. If the
legislature may decide that anthrax presents risks to public safety that are
not warranted by its utility, then- whether or not one happens to agree
with its judgment-it is proper for the legislature to make the same kind of
decision concerning handguns. Nevertheless, libertarians are passionately
hostile to gun control. For example, libertarian David Boaz writes:
One popular solution that will not reduce crime is gun control. There
are more than 200 million privately owned guns in the United States,
and no gun-control measure will ever change that. Law-abiding citizens
have a natural and a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, not just
for hunting but for self-defense and in the last resort for defense of
freedom. 5
Notice that Boaz is not merely arguing that gun control is bad public
policy. In the last sentence set forth above, he is stating that it is
illegitimate for a legislature to enact gun control. But why? Libertarian
philosophy concedes that one of the proper roles of government is to
protect citizens against threats of violence. If, therefore, the legislature
determines that firearm regulations will help do that, how is it somehow
philosophically illegitimate to legislate accordingly? Boaz says doing so
will violate the natural and constitutional rights of citizens. We shall put
the constitutional right aside because we are trying to figure what-beyond
an objective analysis of constitutional history-makes conservatives want
to conclude that the Second Amendment grants an individual right. Boaz
suggests that citizens have a natural right to keep and bear arms. Some
libertarians believe in natural rights, but while they may argue that people
have a natural right of self-defense, I doubt that they claim people have a
natural right to own particular weapons, whether swords, guns, or bombs.
Boaz, I suspect, has confused what he sees as a right of self-defense with a
right to possess arms. I submit that Boaz's thinking actually runs as
follows: (1) people have a natural right of self-defense; (2) to exercise that
right effectively they need to own guns; and (3) the legislature cannot be
entrusted to make judgments balancing the utility of guns for self-defense
56. See Boaz, supra note 55, at 239 (emphasis in original). Boaz is the Executive Vice
President of the Cato Institute.
2008] 263
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against the risks to self-defense created by wide-spread gun ownership.
I happen to disagree with him on these points, 57 as do some
conservatives 58 and libertarians. 59 For present purposes, however, let me
concede, arguendo, all three points. Still, this line of reasoning, or perhaps
more accurately this collection of sentiments, only explains why one would
be disposed to find that the Second Amendment protects private gun
ownership; it does not explain why one would want to premise that right on
an insurrectionist platform. Yet David Boaz, like Antonin Scalia, attached
the insurrectionist rationale to the end of his reasoning, even though it is
unnecessary to either their respective arguments or perhaps even to
ideological sentiments deep in their breasts.
Insurrectionism has metastasized from gun rights literature, to
political and legal literature, to courts, and now to the Supreme Court. In
many instances, I believe, insurrectionism has been added as a rationale for
the individual rights theory of the Second Amendment with little thought,
attached to the end of arguments almost as cabooses are attached to the end
57. See generally Carl T. Bogus, Gun Control and America's Cities: Public Policy and
Politics, 1 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 440 (2008); Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products
Liability, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103 (1991); and Carl T. Bogus, The Strong Case for Gun
Control, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1992, at 19 (examining the relative risks and benefits of
handguns for public safety).
58. Conservative constitutional scholar Douglas W. Kmiec has written:
[T]he words 'a well regulated militia, etc.' have an obvious meaning. The history
reveals an individual right to possess a gun for the purpose of joining with other
members of one's state in a militia to protect against external threat and the
internal risk of tyranny from one's own government.
Yet when Justice Scalia and four other members of the Court decided D.C. v.
Heller, they nullified D.C.'s gun law and cast doubt upon the laws of every state.
From their high bench on that morning, it would not be the democratic choice that
mattered, but theirs. Constitutional text, history, and precedent all set aside.
The long-winded rationalization given supplies no persuasive reason for
misconstruing the Second Amendment to support access to handguns well beyond
any militia service or purpose.
Douglas W. Kmiec, Guns and the Supreme Court: Dead Wrong, TIDINGS ONLINE, July 11,
2008, http://www.the-tidings.com/2008/071108/kmiec.htm. See also J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr.
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l1265118 (arguing that Heller represents "the
Court's failure to adhere to conservative judicial methodology" because it was not
sufficiently committed to textualism, has embarked on an endeavor that will force it to
create something akin to a code of regulations, failed to adequately respect legislative
judgments, and rejected principles of federalism). Judge Wilkinson is both a distinguished
jurist and conservative thinker.
59. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun
Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 (Posner, who is widely considered to be a
libertarian, argues that Heller was wrongly decided).
Heller and Insurrectionism
of trains. It has become almost part of the background music about the
Amendment. Modem conservatism may be skeptical of government, yet
insurrectionism reflects more than skepticism or even mistrust of
government. It springs from a deep fear and hostility toward the
government. It sees the militia not as an instrument for preserving order
and suppressing insurrections, but as an instrument for promoting
insurrection. It does not solve the problem to say that the militia or the
people may only take up arms against the government "if necessary" or "as
a last resort." Tyranny, like beauty, can be in the eye of the holder. When
he leapt to the stage after murdering Abraham Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth
shouted: "Sic semper tyrannis" (thus always to tyrants).6 °
We are dealing with powerful symbols. As the Court's division in
Heller demonstrates, we are moved not as much by analysis as by
instincts-instincts shaped by images, legends, anecdotes, and parables.
When the Supreme Court says the Founders believed in something, it
affects sentiments in much the same way as does a church when it says
what saints believed. Most people, of course, do not read Supreme Court
opinions. However, ideas migrate, and ideas have consequences. The
Republic will endure only as long as its citizens have an unyielding faith in
constitutional democracy and the rule of law. Romanticizing
insurrectionism corrodes that essential faith; and the Court powerfully
romanticizes insurrectionism when it states, with the authority only it
possesses, that the Founders embedded it in the Constitution.
Heller is likely the first in a line of Supreme Court opinions about the
Second Amendment. We must hope that no matter how the Court
ultimately maps the constitutional boundaries of gun control, it will
recognize both the lack of necessity for the insurrectionist rationale and the
perniciousness of legitimizing that idea-and that it will not merely ignore
insurrectionism in its future opinions, but expressly reject it.
60. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 387 n.383.
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